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January 2, 2013

Megaupload: Crooks or Corsairs?

Filed under: Big Ideas,Finance and Economics,Guest Post,Innovation,Uncategorized — 800-CEO-READ @ 4:57 pm
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Rodolphe
Durand
Jean-Philippe
Vergne

by Rodolphe Durand & Jean-Philippe Vergne

Kim Dotcom and his company Megaupload have just crossed over to the dark side. What can we learn from this contemporary pirate’s tale? Once a hard-working employee for well-established companies, Kim Dotcom became a crook, stealing for his own good whilst the State desperately tried to make new legislations to prevent file sharing from proliferating. Just like in a regular TV series, in the end the FBI stepped in to forcibly question Pirate Dotcom on the island where he had found refuge. The FBI also stopped to lay up the vessels of his computer-geek fleet. After Napster did it for music, Megaupload stirred things up with the diffusion of TV programs and films, posing questions about laws regarding intellectual property and the exchange of cultural contents. Indeed, recent events are beginning to show signs of a recurring motif in economic history.

With each great capitalist revolution—orchestrated by States that impose their norms on property and exchange in the name of their sovereignty—we see a new corresponding form of organized piracy emerge, whether it is in the sea, via radio waves, or on the internet. This constitutes a historical motif that is essential to capitalist dynamics and that penetrates a whole collection of peripheral, dissenting and innovative organizations at the heart of State-Company relations. In effect, the actions of pirate organizations highlight the evolution of capitalist societies ever since the Americans made their very first discoveries. Indeed, with every industrial revolution, sovereign States have either granted or passively allowed monopolies to bloom in order to control the economic flux generated at the heart of new capitalist territories (e.g. the monopoly of Western Companies in the Indian Ocean, of AT&T in telecoms, of Microsoft and Google in new technologies). Pirate organizations are consistently challenging this state of affairs. In the latest movement, certain “pirates” have chosen to return to the legal spheres, finding jobs at the heart of the very States or companies that they once threatened. They have become “corsairs.”

This “corsairisation” of pirates is one of the most powerful sources of economic and social change. The pirates of the seas in the 17th Century fought against the monopolization of the companies of the Indies and yet every country in Europe warmly welcomed pirates that had become corsairs in order to thwart the exchanges of their rivals. Pirate radio stations at the start of the 20th Century were transmitted over the airwaves evading all state authorization, but after the war they were swiftly incorporated onto the radio broadcasting scene. Hackers and computer pirates on telephone networks and on the internet are constantly challenging program censors operated by the giants of the sector. However, the best hackers in fine either succeed in creating their companies or end up being hired by Microsoft and Google. Kim Dotcom pushed the boundaries of the law several times. Perhaps this time definitively as he seems to have sunk to the depths of robbery, rather than rising to the spirit of piracy.

Thus, there can be no capitalism without sovereignty and without rules. But equally, if we allow the regulation of territories and the normalization of exchanges to continue to surface, then even more spaces will be created for pirate organizations to nestle into. Some pillage and plunder, others radically innovate, and some even do both at the same time. The challenge lies therefore in unearthing and “corsairising” the initiators of radical innovations by fighting the thieves. Of course, this is a difficult decision to make, but recent cases have shown that sometimes even companies and States can miss the mark and reject the very innovations that are most in line with society.

The Megaupload affair highlights the importance of rethinking laws on intellectual property and on the creation and distribution of cultural goods. Another key issue lies in our incapacity to think of economic evolution in a more inclusive way. Perhaps one way of resolving this could be by actually trying to work with the pirates who push the limits of capitalism with their radical innovations that promote new modes of exchange and embody new values?


Rodolphe Durand is the GDF-Suez Professor of Strategy at HEC Paris. In 2010 he received the European Academy of Management’s Imagination Lab Foundation Award for Innovative Scholarship. His work has been published widely in academic journals.

Jean-Philippe Vergne is an assistant professor of strategy at the Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. His ongoing research on the global arms industry received the inaugural Grigor McClelland Doctoral Dissertation Award in 2011.

Rodolphe and Jean-Philippe recently published The Pirate Organization: Lessons from the Fringes of Capitalism on Harvard Business Review Press.

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December 18, 2012

The Elite Eight: Our Picks for the Top Business Books of 2012

Filed under: Book Awards,Entrepreneurship,Finance and Economics,General Business,General Management,Innovation,Leadership,Marketing,Personal Development,Sales,Small Business — Tags: 2012, awards, best, books, Business, list — Sally @ 12:40 pm
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In anticipation of announcing the winner of the 2012 800-CEO-READ Business Book of the Year tomorrow, here’s a recap of the category winners. Click on the links below to read more about these top books of 2012.

Which book is *your* pick for the top book of the year?

~General Business: PRIVATE EMPIRE | Steve Coll
~Leadership: THE COMMITMENT ENGINE | John Jansch
~Management: THE ADVANTAGE | Pat Lencioni
~Innovation & Creativity: THE ICARUS DECEPTION | Seth Godin
~Small Business & Entrepreneurship: THE $100 STARTUP | Chris Guillibeau
~Sales & Marketing: TO SELL IS HUMAN | Dan Pink
~Personal Development: SO GOOD THEY CAN’T IGNORE YOU | Cal Newport
~Finance & Economics: FINANCE & THE GOOD SOCIETY | Robert Shiller

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September 19, 2012

An Excerpt from The Fine Print

Filed under: Current Events,Excerpts and Essays,Finance and Economics,Global Business — dylan @ 1:41 pm
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Since Michael did such a fine job in his review of Steven Johnson’s Future Perfect on Monday of describing how the future may well be, well… perfect, I will take the role of Debby Downer to remind everyone that the present is far from it. Or, rather, I will use Pulitzer Prize Winning reporter David Cay Johnston’s excellent new book to do it for me.

I don’t think anyone needs to be reminded of just how bad it is back here in the present, but it turns out that much of the current chicanery taking place today is hidden in the fine print so few of us actually read. David Cay Johnston has done an excellent job of reporting those details in The Fine Print: How Big Companies Use “Plain English” to Rob you Blind, released yesterday by Portfolio. (Fans of Retirement Heist, the excellent exposé from Wall Street Journal reporter Ellen Schultz on how corporations manipulate the retirement plans of their employees for their own profit, will find more excellent reporting along the same lines here.) Hopefully you’ve heard something about The Fine Print in the press and will continue to hear more, because it’s a very timely, topical, and important book that’s perfectly suited to the moment.

The Daily Beast ran an excerpt from the book at the beginning of the month about America’s Coming Infrastructure Disaster that is worth a read, and the good people at Portfolio have been kind enough to give us a second excerpt from the book to run here.

If you’d like a book in which “the corporate point of view is secondary to that of customers, workers and taxpayers,” you’ll find affinity with the point of view in The Fine Print. If you’re interested in learning why your phone bill looks the way it does—why in spite of the fact that the FCC requires your phone bill be easy to understand, you may need a lawyer or an accountant to parse it for you—then this book is for you. If you’d like to know how, in spite of laws that ban government gifts to corporations or business entities, your state income taxes may be going directly into your boss’s (or a foreign business owner’s) pockets, then by all means… please read on.

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Jacking Up Prices

The distribution of wealth is not determined by nature. It is determined by public policy.
—Eric Schneiderman, New York State attorney general

1. Friends and colleagues have always known that Adam Leipzig husbands his own money and reliably earns profits on funds others entrust to him. As a young executive at Disney, Leipzig oversaw Dead Poets Society; Good Morning, Vietnam; and Honey, I Shrunk the Kids. Later, as president of National Geographic Films, he was behind March of the Penguins. His films have brought in $2.1 billion, seven times what it cost to produce them. That makes him a Hollywood rarity—a reliable steward for investors in the risky business of moviemaking.

Because it was so small, the one thing Leipzig never gave much thought to was his monthly phone bill. When it came, Leipzig checked to see how many long-distance calls, if any, had been made and wrote a check. But his casual view changed one day near the turn of the century during a meeting at the AT&T offices in Los Angeles.

Leipzig had wrangled a meeting with AT&T marketing executives to propose a strategic alliance to help him start his own film production company. Leipzig left with everything he wanted, but a decade later the terms of his successful deal were mostly forgotten. What remained vivid in his memory was what the phone guys had said about the future of his and everyone else’s telephone bills. Their private comments differed dramatically from what everyone in America had been hearing for a quarter century about the costs of telephone calls and, for the previous fi ve or so years, about this wondrous new thing called the Internet. The promise of cheap and abundant telecommunications service, to be available almost anywhere, was becoming a major theme in telecommunications industry marketing.

But that was not at all what the telephone guys said in private while meeting with Leipzig.

“They said their corporate strategy was that, within a few years, AT&T wanted to draw at least $100 a month from each client household,” Leipzig recalled. “They would do this with phone service, and also things they were not offering at the time, or had not expanded as much—mobile, Internet and cable.”

As your monthly phone bill probably tells you, this is exactly what has happened. At the time, Adam Leipzig’s home phone bill ran $35 a month. A decade later, the total amount due AT&T every month was more than $200, even though he buys his cable television service from another company.

What the marketing executives had forecast had indeed come to pass.

THE RISE OF FALLING PRICES

Since 1974, politicians, pundits and professional economists all have said that, thanks to competition, the cost of telephone service would fall. The Justice Department sued that year to break up the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, saying Ma Bell’s monopoly hindered new technologies and shouldered aside competitors who wanted in on the lucrative business of long-distance calls. (Back then calls were so expensive that many people kept little sand dials by their telephones when calling loved ones long distance so as not to go a second too long saying good-bye and be charged for another full minute.) Eventually the antitrust case was settled by negotiation and, in 1984, Ma Bell spun off seven regional telephone monopolies known as the Baby Bells.

AT&T kept the lucrative long-distance business, but even before the breakup, another monopoly business, a railroad, found a way to compete in long-distance calling. Southern Pacific Railroad began offering limited long-distance service in 1972. SP microwave towers, which kept the trains running on time, sent signals along the narrow rights-of-way that the federal government had given the railroad in the nineteenth century. These towers had the capacity to handle calls, too, and by 1978 SP was providing a cheap long-distance system connecting business customers in Los Angeles, San Diego and Anaheim, California, with those in three East Coast cities, Boston, New York and Philadelphia.

Southern Pacific Communications would eventually evolve into today’s Sprint Nextel, but by the 1990s, a number of competing systems were being served by a growing network of glass fibers buried alongside the tracks. These braided glass strands, each thinner than a human hair, held vastly more capacity than the microwave system, which in turn was far more powerful than the old copper wires used to make the first commercial telephone call in 1878 and still in use today in most homes and small businesses. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the whole country buzzed with talk of a new Information Superhighway that would connect everyone in America; the oft-expressed expectation was that, thanks to competition, prices would fall lower and lower. Some published studies even showed that the cost of long-distance calling would fall more than 99 percent, which was not exactly good news for AT&T as a dedicated long-distance company, nor for its nascent competitors. In Washington, awestruck lawmakers marveled at the idea that every word and image in all 22 million books in the Library of Congress could be sent in the blink of an eye to any place connected by the new fiber-optic cables.

Across the country from our friend Adam Leipzig, Bruce Kushnick in Brooklyn, New York, had his own epiphany. Visiting an aging aunt, Kushnick discovered twenty years’ worth of monthly telephone bills. Kushnick worked as a telephone industry consultant, paid to extol the virtues of the coming new era of digital communications.

Kushnick knew a research gold mine when he saw one, and he set to work. When he cross-checked his aunt’s telephone bills over the years, he could hardly believe the numbers. His aunt paid $9.51 for her local phone service in 1984. By 2003 her bill had swollen fourfold to $38.90. In the two decades since the breakup of the AT&T monopoly, even after adjusting for inflation, his aunt’s telephone cost $2.30 for each dollar paid in 1984. And that was without any charges for long-distance calls.

His little history lesson prompted Kushnick to think about the telephone bill itself. Old telephone bills—from the era of the Great Depression of the 1930s, for example—often consisted of three lines. One was the monthly charge. The second was the cost of long-distance calls. The third was the total.

With the passing years, Kushnick noted, the bills had gotten more and more complicated. When AT&T started offering phones in colors, colored phones came with an extra charge. So did the immensely popular Princess telephone for the bedroom in 1959. In 1963 the first push-button phones were introduced (called Touch-Tone), and people paid extra to escape rotary dialing. Two years later came sleek Trimline phones with lighted dials—along with another extra charge.

The publicly switched telephone network, as it was known in the industry, was upgraded for emergency calls to 911. Then it was upgraded again with ANI (automatic number indicator) so that emergency dispatch centers would know the numbers of callers, and later with ALI, or automatic location indicator. The cost of ALI was justified, as it saved the lives of many people in the midst of medical emergencies or assaults, even if they were unable to say where they were. But the public paid both for its installation and for some other things, too, as some of the money collected was diverted to other uses, including new equipment the phone companies said was necessary to make ALI work.

Soon after the railroad rights-of-way microwave towers made possible the first sliver of long-distance calling competition, telephone bills became even more complicated. In the late 1970s, while the breakup of Ma Bell was under negotiation with the Justice Department, AT&T began seeking limits on free directory-assistance calls. It seemed a curious move—Ma Bell executives and spokesmen at the time told anyone who would listen that free directory-assistance calls encouraged more calling—but the AT&T shift away from free directory assistance was brilliant in the way that it quietly raised prices.

State utility regulators were told that telemarketing companies were taking advantage of free directory assistance, placing many thousands of calls to 411. That, in turn, was described as a hidden cost borne by residential and small-business customers. Thus, AT&T was able to argue that the consumer would pay a little bit less if fewer operators were employed looking up numbers for “junk calls.”

The state utility regulators might have just slapped a charge on any business that made large numbers of directory assistance calls. Or a rule could have been adopted that applied only to telemarketing firms and commercial customers. Instead, as the telephone company had requested, the state regulators limited how many free calls to directory assistance any customer could make.

At first, the limit was ten calls. Over time, the limit was trimmed in stages to zero; by 2008, “free” had become a fee, with many customers paying $1.99 each time they called directory assistance, adding more lines of fine print to telephone bills. Verizon Wireless and some other companies did not list charges for calling directory assistance separately, but hid them in plain sight among the monthly list of calls made, a portion of the bill many people typically find tiresome to examine line by line.

Today it’s typical to be charged for not being listed in the telephone directory, and, by the way, it’s not a one-time fee to defray the cost of flipping an internal computer signal, but a monthly fee. Think of it as a charge for no service. Over the years the white pages, which used to be dropped free on every doorstep, became less common and less thorough; they no longer appear in some communities. That translates to an increased number of calls to directory assistance—for which a fee is collected. While various white-pages listings appeared on the Internet, the telephone companies spent little to keep them up to date, which of course drove more business to paid 411 services. When new services such as call waiting and three-party calling were introduced, they bore stiff additional charges, too.

With AT&T’s breakup into Ma and the seven Baby Bells, new charges were introduced for regional calls, those that were neither local nor long distance. Known as Local Access and Transport Area or LATA, the implementation of this system also meant that, in some metropolitan markets, the circle shrank within which unlimited calls could be made at no extra charge. In some cases a call to a neighbor went from free to dear because of illogical LATA boundaries.

New costs came at the consumer from all angles. Until the 1984 breakup, regulations required customers to use the telephone set installed by Ma Bell. After the breakup, customers were told they could either buy or rent their phone. At first, the rental seemed cheap, but gradually people learned how little a telephone costs to make and also realized how much an open-ended rental could cost.

And then there was the expense associated with making sure the phone line in your house actually worked. Ma Bell got state public utility commissions to transfer ownership of the telephone line at the point where it entered your home or office. Once that happened, customers had to pay to fix any wires inside their homes or businesses that, say, got wet or gnawed by a rodent. But there was an option, namely a monthly “wire maintenance” fee, which added yet another extra charge for what once had been included in the basic price.

Bit by bit, the line items grew, and others were added. It was easy to miss the escalating prices because they came separately over time—a nickel on one line of the bill, a quarter or two on another. With many small line items, people tended not to notice how the total was creeping upward much faster than the rate of inflation or the size of their income.

Kushnick found his aunt’s bills printed on multiple slips of paper, making it hard to spot everything at once. He noticed some charges were for services his aunt did not use; a few were for services she couldn’t possibly use because her telephone was too antiquated. And the monthly rental for the phone itself? Kushnick calculated that his aunt had paid more than twenty times the price of the instrument with that small monthly rental fee.

One of the fastest-growing items Kushnick found on his aunt’s bill was labeled “FCC Subscriber Line Charge.” Other phone companies call this “FCC Charge for Network Access” or “Federal Line Cost Charge” or “Interstate Access Charge.” Variations include “Federal Access Charge,” “Interstate Single Line Charge,” “Customer Line Charge,” “FCCApproved Customer Line Charge” and even “End User Fee.”

These may sound like government fees, or perhaps a disguised tax on telephone users that goes into federal coffers. Not so. Each of those labels identifies the charge for connection to the long-distance network. The government does not collect a penny from that charge. All the money goes to the phone companies.

According to Federal Communications Commission rules, phone bills are supposed to be easy to understand. The FCC truth-in-billing policy supposedly “improve[s] consumers’ understanding of their telephone bills.” According to the FCC:

Section 64.2401 of the rules requires that a telephone company’s bill must: (1) be accompanied by a brief, clear, non-misleading, plain language description of the service or services rendered; (2) identify the service provider associated with each charge; (3) clearly and conspicuously identify any change in service provider; (4) contain full and non-misleading descriptions of charges; (5) identify those charges. …

Despite the misleading labeling of the network “line charge,” the FCC has approved it for years, offi cially helping confuse consumers. Among the honest descriptions the FCC might have required would be “long-distance system access” and “telephone company network charge.”

Inspired by his study of the evolution of the phone bill, Bruce Kushnick decided to find out how many people were misled by terms like “FCC Subscriber Line Charge.” In a survey of one thousand Americans, he found three people who understood their phone bill, which means 99.7 percent did not. Round to the nearest whole number, and Kushnick’s finding was that 100 percent of those surveyed did not understand their phone bill. In effect, no one understands his or her telephone bill, which amounts to a powerful rebuke to FCC policies that clearly harm consumers and benefit the telephone companies. In the years since that survey, however, the FCC has made no meaningful changes to rules that allow phone companies to confuse people. Don’t blame the FCC staff for that. As with all government agencies, the bureaucrats do what the politicians tell them to do.

PROMISES, PROMISES
What Leipzig and Kushnick encountered were early signs that the lower prices made possible by competition and digital technology were just empty promises. This involved more than money, since the telephone industry, together with the cable television industry, quietly saw to it that written into the fine print were laws and regulations that made it easier for them to minimize their investments in new technology and to serve only the customers the companies wanted.

Since 1913 Americans had enjoyed a legal right to a landline telephone at any address, but by 2012 that right had been legislated away so quietly that my Reuters columns were the first to report this trend. The right to a landline was taken away without any news coverage in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. In Kentucky and New Jersey enough attention was aroused that consumer groups fought the changes, but they faced powerful obstacles. AT&T hired thirty-six lobbyists to work the Kentucky state legislature. In California the consumer group The Utility Rate Network (TURN) counted 120 AT&T lobbyists, one for each member of the Golden State legislature.

The telecommunications companies wanted to build the most profitable electronic toll road possible. Their aim was, first, to spend as little as possible on technology, which ultimately meant slow Internet service for many customers. Second, they wanted to serve areas where lots of customers could and would buy a monthly pass to get on this electronic highway; potential customers in sparsely populated areas were at best incidental to such plans. Third, they wanted to set prices as high as the market would bear, even if it meant many people could never afford to access this electronic roadway.

Lost in the rush to profitability was the crucial fact that the federal government had established an underlying policy to make telecommunications services available to all at reasonable prices. Compared to the rest of the modern world, American phone companies, along with cable television companies, have done a spectacular job of building only what and where they wanted while shoving the cost on to their captive customers.

Instead of increased competition between the telephone and cable companies, a new cartel emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While telephone and cable companies posed in public as rivals, Verizon made a deal to sell its branded services over cable company Comcast’s lines, and vice versa. The only risk of real competition arose when some local governments favored the idea of building a municipal telephone, cable television and Internet access system that would be faster and cheaper. The industry responded like sharks, determined to do in the opposition and protect their predatory position. [In The Fine Print, you’ll] see how those and other efforts to kill competition fared (see chapter 5, “In Twenty-ninth Place and Fading Fast,” page 50).

READING BETWEEN THE LINES

How the promise of cheap, competitive and unlimited telecommunications service has been turned into a reality of expensive, monopolistic and limited service is just one part of the larger transformation in the American economy since the late 1970s. A host of large industries, including banks, credit card lenders, electric utilities, health care, oil pipelines, Hollywood studios, property insurance, railroads and water companies, all have worked quietly to rewrite America’s economic playbook in their favor.

In The Fine Print, we’ll look at how legislatures have rewritten basic business laws, some whose principles date back thousands of years. Too often the goal has been to thwart competition, artificially inflate prices, hold down wages by decimating unions, reduce worker benefits and then restrict or bar access to the courts by those aggrieved. Businesses have gotten policies adopted that have allowed some managers to run corporations as, effectively, criminal enterprises, something modern management and economic theory regard as outside their fields of expertise (and at best implausible) but that criminologists have a name for: control fraud. That means, in short, that those in control run the fraud, as we shall see.

While schoolchildren are taught about heroic figures who raised the capital to build new factories and fill offices, these days large companies rely on taxpayers for that money. Almost every brand-name company is in on these deals; state and local governments alone spend at least $70 billion a year of taxpayers’ money to subsidize factories, office buildings and the like, according to Professor Kenneth Thomas, a University of Missouri–St. Louis political scientist. That burden comes to $900 per year for a family of four. My only criticism of Thomas’s work is that I believe he understates the cost by an unknown but considerable sum.

The worst of these are laws in nineteen states that let companies pocket the state income taxes withheld from their workers’ paychecks for up to twenty-five years. Hard as it is to believe such laws exist, they do, and they are spreading fast. General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Procter & Gamble and more than 2,700 other big companies have these deals. It is not just American companies, either. Siemens, the big German computer maker, the Swedish appliance maker Electrolux and a host of Japanese, Canadian and European banks have similar arrangements with states from New Jersey to Oregon. In many of these subsidy programs, no jobs are created. Instead the state income taxes are given to companies that agree to move jobs from one state across the border to another, as AMC Theatres agreed to do in moving its headquarters from Kansas City, Missouri, to Leawood, Kansas, just ten miles away. AMC will get to pocket $47 million withheld from its workers, a boon to its major owners: J. P. Morgan, Apollo Management, the Carlyle Group and the firm Mitt Romney cofounded in 1984, Bain Capital Management.

From the corporations’ point of view, the best part is that the workers are left in the dark. None of these states requires that workers be told that their state income taxes go to their employers—that they are in effect being taxed by their bosses. GE says that it did tell its Ohio workers about how it updated its operations there, investing $126 million and pocketing $115.3 million of tax monies. GE shareholders paid just eight cents on the dollar for the investment.

Legislatures passed these laws, presidents and governors signed them and the courts have endorsed them. In many cases they effectively gut state constitutional provisions and laws banning gifts to business.

In New York, lawyer James Ostrowskifi led a lawsuit on behalf of more than fifty citizens, ranging from serious libertarians to liberal Democrats, challenging a gift of at least $1.4 billion of state taxpayer funds to a company controlled by Abu Dhabi’s hereditary ruler, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, one of the wealthiest people in the world. The sheikh’s company, GlobalFoundries, is building a microchip factory in the Hudson River Valley near Albany. Back in 1846, the New York State constitution banned gifts to corporations or other business entities, a provision that the voters reaffirmed in 1874, 1938 and again in 1967. In each case the vote was by a margin of two to one, which would seem to make the desires of voters clear.

In deciding Ostrowski’s suit, two justices said such gifts were plainly illegal. But the court majority found a way around this. They reasoned that while the state government could not make such gifts, the legislature could create an economic development agency, give it the money and, in turn, the agency could give it away to the sheikh and any other business owner. If parallel reasoning were applied to drug deals, the kingpins who finance the drug trade could never be convicted of a crime as long as they do not touch the drugs.

The court also showed its contempt for those who challenge giveaways in its final order in the case, which ordered Ostrowski to pay $100 because he asked for a rehearing to show the factual errors in the court ruling.

You’ll learn in The Fine Print how other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have diminished the rights of consumers, voters and workers while enhancing corporate power. One instance was the Lilly Ledbetter case, which demonstrated the willingness of the court majority to favor corporations over people. Ledbetter retired in 1998 after almost two decades at a Goodyear Tire & Rubber plant in Gadsden, Alabama. Only when she was leaving did she learn that the men holding the same job she had held all earned significantly more—as much as $18,000 a year more. Paying men 40 percent more than women for the same work looks like an easy case of discrimination. But the Supreme Court said that Ledbetter’s legal right to sue ended 180 days after the discrimination first took place, which was so many years earlier that the court ruled she had lost her right to sue. But how would Ledbetter have known she was being discriminated against? Only by a tortured reading of the statute could the majority rule against Ledbetter.

Bits and pieces of the complex story of business gaming government and gaining unfair advantage over consumers have been reported in the press, most often on the business pages. That coverage, however, tends to be narrow, typically portraying what are fundamental issues as disputes between competing industries, say, telephone companies versus cable companies or truckers versus railroads. Looked at from a larger perspective, these disputes were really about how to raise prices, limit competition, and diminish consumer protections. But the forest was often lost in the trees.

Similarly, banking gets lots of news coverage, but usually from the point of view of the bankers or bank investors, not customers. This seems odd for mass media given that bank owners are few and bank customers abound. An exception to this focus on bank owners came in the intense coverage in 2011 of Bank of America’s plan to impose a $5 monthly fee on some debit card users, a plan it withdrew in the face of popular criticism. To corporate publicists this fiasco was a reminder of why they are employed—to make sure the news media stays focused on what the companies want, not on customers, lest they demand reforms.

That meant you didn’t read how Bank of America treated customers who deposited a check that bounced. BofA hits customers with a $12 “chargeback” fee for each bounced deposit. Suppose you waited for your bank to advise that the deposit had cleared and only then wrote checks. In New York the courts say the bank can still unclear the deposit and hit you with overdrafts fees, which at BofA are $35 per check.

What does it cost banks to deal with a bounced check? Back in the late 1970s, when checks were still processed by a person and a machine rather than digitally, Crocker Bank (now part of Wells Fargo) was forced to reveal in a California court case that its cost was thirty cents. At that time, the bank was charging customers $6 for bounced checks, a markup of 2,000 percent. The California Supreme Court held that charging twenty times cost was not necessarily unconscionable. Adjusted for inflation, that $6 fee would now be $21, less than half what BofA charges.

What are today’s bank costs for processing a bounced check? BofA won’t tell customers, but research papers on costs in the digital era suggest it could be less than a penny, making the markup by BofA in the neighborhood of 470,000 percent. But corporate values now so infuse our society that price gouging is easily brushed off as a function of competition, regardless of whether that’s the truth or an ideological fantasy.

No other modern country gives corporations the unfettered power found in America to gouge customers, shortchange workers and erect barriers to fair play. A big reason is that so little of the news, which informs us about the world around us, addresses the private, government-approved mechanisms by which price gouging is employed to redistribute income upward. When news breaks about one company buying another, the focus is almost always on the bottom line and how shareholders will benefit from higher prices and less competition; much less is said about added costs for customers as competition wanes. This powerful yet subtle bias appeals to advertisers such as mutual funds and other financial services companies who wish to address investors.

On arrival at the Philadelphia Inquirer in 1988, I sought to chronicle the coming spread of gambling. Part of the job was to report the monthly results from Atlantic City. Most papers reported how much the casinos won, but on the theory that there was just a handful of casino owners and millions of players, I looked at the story from the players’ point of view, reporting the sum of all player losses at the slots and table games.

That first month, I wrote that Atlantic City gamblers lost a record amount of money in the seaside temples of chance. When I left Philadelphia for The New York Times, however, the Inquirer went back to reporting the casino winnings, just like every other news organization, once again seeing the story from the corporate point of view.

I believe people want news about the issues that concern them, but the slant, whether it’s on corporate takeovers, consumer price levels or gambling outcomes, is typically reported in ways that address the interests of investors, not customers. Such investor-oriented reporting is one reason why fewer people pay to have a newspaper delivered at home.

In The Fine Print, the corporate point of view is secondary to that of customers, workers and taxpayers. Much of what is reported in these pages will be new to you; even specialty industry publications don’t cover this ground. You will read about the machinations used to inflate profits through a regulation that imposes a tax that does not exist and how, in one case, I got this legalized theft stopped, a result that demonstrates that foul practices can be ended if readers simply act on what they learn and speak up at public hearings.

You will read about why your retirement funds are not safe and why you and your children are endangered because of little-known government rules that give safety waivers to deadly industrial facilities underneath schools and playgrounds whose locations are kept secret by the federal Department of Transportation.

You will even read about an insurance company owned by one of America’s most admired billionaires that asked a paralyzed man to die because the cost of keeping him alive was cutting into the insurer’s profits.

I invite you to read, to see these and other awful stories in context, and to learn how business has been regulated throughout history. I will try to offer a sense of how, in the past four decades, we have forgotten the tried and tested (and therefore profoundly conservative) principles of business developed over thousands of years. Allowing corporate values to overwhelm us is not necessary—I will close with some suggestions and solutions—but, in the meantime, our wealth, our well-being and our freedom are being diminished daily.

Excerpted from The Fine Print: How Big Companies use “Plain English” to Rob You Blind
Copyright © David Cay Johnston, 2012.
All rights reserved
Reprinted by arrangement with Portfolio/Penguin, a member of Penguin Group (USA), Inc.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David Cay Johnston is a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter who has been called the “de facto chief tax enforcer of the United States.” His most recent books, Perfectly Legal and Free Lunch, were New York Times bestsellers. he was a reporter for The New York Times for thirteen years and now writes a column for Reuters. He also teaches at Syracuse University College of Law and the Whitman School of Management, and he was recently elected board president of Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc. He live is Rochester, New York.

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September 12, 2012

500 Days, Eleven Years Later

Filed under: Book Reviews,Current Events,Finance and Economics,History and Biographies,Leadership — dylan @ 9:35 am
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It’s the morning after 9/11, eleven years later.

As I sat down to write this post yesterday, I began typing up a description of four commercial airplanes hijacked by religious zealots and flown into the heart of the American establishment: two hitting a set of twin towers in the middle of the country’s financial district, which when built were the tallest on Earth; another crashing into a five-sided office building—still the largest on Earth by sheer floor area—that housed the nerve center of the mightiest military the world has ever known; and one that was brought down in a field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania before it could reach it’s final target, believed to be either the White House or the U.S. Capitol Building, to strike at the political leadership of a 235-year-old experiment in self-government that constructed a system from scratch that built those buildings and the civilian infrastructure that each of them housed.

As I was writing that description, two things struck me. First, that everyone already knows that story and can conjure up images of each horrific scene just by hearing the words nine and eleven placed next to each other. And, second, if we hadn’t lived through it, it would sound unbelievable—it would sound like a scene from a second-rate thriller or science fiction film. But, as they say, truth is stranger than fiction. What isn’t mentioned is that it’s also more brutal, and the only way we get along at all or get through the day is that we don’t dwell on how close we are to the precipice of potential chaos that exists in every moment.

But as many somber ceremonies reminded us yesterday, it wasn’t science fiction. It really did happen, and the country that those planes flew above and then smashed into has altered drastically since. Some of the biggest changes are chronicled in Kurt Eichenwald’s excellent new book, 500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars. The 500 Days (“554 to be exact”) the title refers to are the eighteen months after 9/11 in which the judgements that “every aspect of the terror wars flowed from” were made.

He writes in his brief introduction to the book that “Readers looking in these pages for my view of these events will no doubt be disappointed. I have little faith in opinion, even my own. Instead, this book is meant to be a dispassionate history of this crucial time.”

I have little faith in opinion, as well (especially my own) but I found Eichenwald to be a very passionate, though non-partisan, reporter. He writes with an immediacy and an intimacy with his subjects that is rare in nonfiction.

Originally intended to be a book about the Bush Administration’s response to 9/11, the author quickly realized that the scope of the story was much, much larger and his approach was off-base, writing:

I found that the strategy cobbled together in those initial days was not the creation of a single group of politicians or even a single government. The Bush Administration was important, but America did not hold a monopoly on shaping the multipronged assault on terrorists.

So, I changed directions. By concentrating my research on the rush of events over those 554 days, I would be able to lay bare the essence of a trauma that haunts the world to this day. I later decided that the full story could not be understood simply from depictions of events in the corridors of power; this history was also shaped by the experiences of the powerless. Extraordinary rendition was not simply a policy adopted in government conference rooms—it played out in real ways on real people’s lives, as did decisions about the application of the Geneva Conventions, the use of secret prisons, and the like. These experiences, sometimes horrendous, helped shape directions of international policies in profound and often unseen ways. I would be remiss in ignoring those individual consequences.

So instead of a book solely about one administration, this book is a complex quilt of human stories, and Eichenwald pulls at each thread to unwind and then reconstruct the entire picture. Beginning twelve months before 9/11 on a ranch in Crawford, Texas with soon-to-be-president George Bush, and ending aboard the USS Carl Vinson as the body of Osama Bin Laden “sank silently to the bottom of the sea,” the author tells the story of our times with the individual stories of people wrapped up in each decision and every moment.

Fans of Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail will recognize a similar narrative approach in Eichenwald’s 500 Days, and will find that the pages turn just as fast. That’s good, because like Too Big to Fail it is a big book. The cast of characters he lists at the front of the book alone reaches eleven pages (Sorkin’s was eight), and the way the author reconstructs their stories makes you feel as if you were in the room when it all went down. If you remember the scene at the beginning of Too Big to Fail in which the leaders of Lehman Brothers, Dick Fuld and Joseph Gregory, are making their way to Wall Street (in a chauffeured Mercedes and private helicopter, respectively) as the financial world is collapsing around them, you’ll be equally transfixed by the scene in which secretary of transportation Norm Mineta is driving up the White House as an exodus of staffers heads the other way on the morning of 9/11—and 500 Days is filled with such stories.

The buildings hit on 9/11 were symbols of our financial and military might. The terrorists didn’t succeed that day, but within a decade we had done much of their work for them from within, with those on Wall Street bringing the financial system to its knees, and those in the Pentagon and offices of government chipping away at individual liberties in the name of security. When historians look back at the beginning of what I hope will be a second “American century,” they will look at the events chronicled in 500 Days and Too Big to Fail—the Great Crash and Pearl Harbor of our generation—and find two excellent narratives that bring the two crises back to life.

They will study these two catastrophic events and our responses to them, and be either amazed that—despite some initial missteps—we overcame them and got it right in the end, or they will see the beginning of the end of American ascendancy. The choice really is that dramatic, and it really is up to us. It doesn’t have to do as much with political party as it does with pragmatic principles and problem-solving, and like the challenges our grandparents confronted in the middle of the last century, ours aren’t confined within our borders. We emerged from a Great Depression and a two World Wars in the last century as an engine of growth the likes of which the world had never seen, helped rebuild a continent abroad and stand it up against the rise of political and economic totalitarianism—totalitarianism we defeated without firing a single shot. That say that truth is stranger than fiction, but it can also more spectacular.

9/11 will forever be a day to look back, to remember the dead, and to honor our soldiers and first responders with moments of silence and ceremony. It’s now the morning after 9/11, eleven years later. It’s time to look forward again, to get back to building our future, and the next 500 days will be critical.

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August 20, 2012

Innovation Economics

Filed under: Book Reviews,Current Events,Finance and Economics — dylan @ 4:19 pm
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Politicians and the punditry across the country are making a good living discussing America’s decline, but no one seems to be doing very much about it other than asking people to “vote for me” or “listen to me.” It seems like every time we turn to the news, it’s the same story with a different punchline, usually dictated by what side of the political divide the speaker is coming from.

Robert Atkinson and Stephen Ezell’s new book, Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage, is a welcome, wonkish 440 page respite. As both parties harden their rhetoric in the run up to the November election, Atkinson and Ezell discuss the forces reshaping the world economy and what America needs to do to remain competitive and regain its position as the world’s economic and innovation engine. It will take, first and foremost, changing the conversation and challenging the status quo:

Success for any organization, whether a company or a nation, depends first and foremost on an ability to challenge status quo thinking, for “groupthink” leads individuals to believe that they know what the problem is (or worse, that there is no problem in the first place). As Henry Ford once said, “Thinking is the hardest work there is, which is probably the reason why so few engage in it.” For any nation to win the race for innovation advantage, it has to start with thinking and, when necessary, challenging the prevailing thinking.

Challenging prevailing, out-of-date thinking is innovation in its own right, but innovation is more than that. … While organizations (and entrepreneurial individuals) drive innovation, it is nations that enable, support, and spur it on, or restrict, hinder, and retard it. Because of that, innovation policy—the constellation of government policies from tax, to trade, to talent, to technology that support a nation’s innovation ecosystyem—has become the single most important factor nations need to get right if they are to thrive in the globally competitive economy.

Atkinson and Ezell begin by discussing the underlying causes of the housing bubble and Great Recession, and paralleling the story of American decline with that of the United Kingdom a decade ago, showing the striking similarities between the nature and causes of each decline. They lay out twenty major causes at work, demonstrating that industrial decline is not a mystery and certainly doesn’t have to occur. They then tackle the “myths, nostrums, and dogmas that all too often pass for reasoned economic analysis” before clearly defining what innovation is and how it has become the determining force of every nation’s economic success. They follow this by discussing the need for good innovation policy and show us just how poorly most countries are doing in this regard, relying on outdated economic policy thinking and “innovation mercantilism,” and “making the global economy less prosperous and more fragile in the process.”

The authors then lay out in sharp detail something missing from the national debate at the moment—solutions. These are the Innovation Policy “I’s” of Inspiration, Intention, Insight, Incentives, Institutional Innovation, Investment, and Information Technology. Each is discussed in detail, and illustrated with real-world examples. Hopefully policy makers will take note.

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August 6, 2012

Red Ink

Filed under: Big Ideas,Finance and Economics — dylan @ 5:49 pm
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You may know David Wessel as the white bearded journalist from Washington Week. What you may not know even if you watch that show is how great a writer he is. He is the Wall Street Journal economics editor, has multiple Pulitzer Prizes, and when we were still reeling from financial catastrophe in 2009 he wrote a brilliant book, In Fed We Trust, about the folks putting out the fire that made me feel as the world might not end after all.

His new book, Red Ink: Inside the High-Stakes Politics of the Federal Budget (published last month by Crown Business), isn’t quite as comforting, but it’s also not the apocalyptic screed we’ve become accustomed to hearing when discussing the country’s deficit. Like his previous book, Wessel does a masterful job of taking on a topic that has been hyper-politicized and stripping away the over-sized, hyperbolic rhetoric we’re all force-fed in what passes for political discourse every day and in its place explains clearly and concisely the history of priorities and programs that have brought us to this current moment, and how each side of the aisle has contributed to the debate and the resulting debt we now face. He very smartly walks us through the exact breakdown of how our tax dollars were spent in 2011, but before doing so, Wessel first chronicles the history of the modern budget in six pieces.

For this post, I’ve excerpted a bit of each of those pieces (heavily edited for brevity) below, but if you’re intrigued by this history (or just want to see how to write a brief and brilliant history of a monumental topic through the experiences of just one man that’s been close to it all—in this case Leon Panetta) you’ll want to pick up the book and read more.

The New Deal: The Beginning of “Big Government”

With Social Security—the first of the enduring and popular social programs that enlarged the federal government’s role in providing for the poor, sick, and elderly—FDR also planted the seeds of the modern American welfare state and a bigger federal government. When he died in 1945, government spending, swollen by the cost of fighting World War II, exceeded 40 percent of GDP. It fell after the war but would never return to pre-FDR levels.

“From the mid-1930s to the 1970s, the government made a set of commitments that led to expectations on the part of the American people about what their government owes them,” says Robert Reischauer, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office. “And they’re totally unprepared to go back to a different world.”

The Great Society: Guns, Butter, and Medicare

Before Medicare, only about half the elderly had any health insurance. … But Medicare is a leading example of the law of unintended consequences. It’s a living laboratory. Science moves in unpredictable spurts. Government incentives often do much more or much less than expected. Profit-minded entrepreneurs exploit the government’s largesse. Cost squeezed out of one place pop up elsewhere; save money by discouraging inpatient surgery and outpatient costs skyrocket, for instance. And it is increasingly expensive. Adjusted for inflation, the federal government spent more on Medicare and Medicaid in 2011 than it spent on everything in 1960.

Nixon: Congress Strikes Back

Among his other accomplishments (or transgressions), Richard Nixon antagonized Congress by refusing to spend billions of dollars that lawmakers had approved. In 1974, Congress struck back with the Congressional Budget Act … The most durable innovation was the creation of the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO, which freed Congress from relying almost exclusively on economic forecasts and budget analysis from the White House budget office. [...]

“To a degree that may have been unforeseen when the 1974 act was formulated,” University of Maryland budget maven Allen Schick says, “the new system institutionalized and expanded budgetary conflict.” Eventually, the two branches have to agree on spending bills or the government shuts down. “But first,” says Schick, “they fight … [not] over the details, as was once common, [but] over big policy matters—the size of government, defense versus domestic programs, how much total spending and revenues should rise … whether to cut the defecit by trimming expenditures or by boosting taxes, and so on.”

The Reagan Revolution: The Beast Is Not Starved

The Reagan presidency was styled as a turning point in American politics: the end of the New Deal and the beginning of an era in which government would retreat from the economy. Ronald Reagan made three significant promises during his campaign for the presidency: cut taxes, rebuild the nation’s defenses, and balance the budget. He delivered on the first two, but not the third. [...]

… [T]he result was the 1981 tax cut without the hoped-for spending cuts. [Reagan's budget director David] Stockman famously predicted deficits of “$200 billion a year as far as the eye can see,” numbers that sounded huge at the time. He was prescient. The 1980s broke a pattern in which the federal government ran deficits only in wartime. The deficits topped $200 billion a year from 1983 through 1992. They would have been even bigger if Reagan hadn’t flinched on taxes, accepting significant tax increases in 1982 and 1984.

The Arrival of Surpluses: Reading George H.W. Bush’s Lips

Bush was elected in 1988 with one memorable promise: “Read my lips, no new taxes.” Republican pollster Richar Wirthlin once called them “the six most destructive words in the history of presidential politics.” [...]

Beyond the important details of spending and taxes, the 1990 deal made two significant changes:

It established a pay-as-you-go rule that made it hard for Congress to cut taxes or increase benefits without offsetting tax increases or spending cuts. For more than a decade this rule restrained Congress from significant expansion of government benefits. A decade later, when this rule lapsed, Congress and the president did exactly what the rule was sought to avoid: expanded Medicare to cover prescription drugs without funding the new program.
After bumping up spending in the first year to buy congressional backing for the deal, the 1990 agreement also set multi-year caps on annual appropriations for the first time. Congress was, essentially, tying its own hands, or at least promising to do so. In one sense, the caps held. Adjusted for inflation, annually appropriated spending in 1996 was 13 percent below the 1990 level. [...]

The 1990 deal was only a down payment, though. Debate over how much the government should spend and on what continued.

The Return of Deficits: Tax Cuts, Wars, and Prescription Drugs

For four years, 1998 through 2001, the federal government ran surpluses, a remarkable development that put deficit worrywarts nearly out of business and made all the warnings about rising health care costs and the approaching retirement of baby boomers much less threatening. As a presidential candidate, George W. bush promised to tap the surpluses to cut taxes. [...]

Once in office, George W. Bush delivered on his campaign promise to cut taxes. His first tax cut, in 2001, was smaller than Reagan’s but was followed by additional tax cuts the following four years that collectively exceeded Reagan’s. Simultaneously, most of the spending restraints written into his father’s 1990 deficit deal expired. Then, at the end of Bush’s first year in office, his presidency was redefined by the 9/11 terror attacks, and so was the federal budget. Two wars and intensified efforts at homeland security increased spending significantly. In 2001, defense spending was 3 percent of GDP, half the Reagan-era peak. In 2011, it was 5 percent.

Bush also signed into law the first significant expansion of Medicare in forty years.

Wessel moves on from there to explain the specifics of the budget, where the money comes from, and where it ends up. Would you like to know how farm subsidies came into existence, who receives them, and how exactly they’re paid out? They’ve been around since the Great Depressionm but they’ve changed a great deal since then. Wessel explains:

The 1996 Freedom to Farm Act severed some ling-standing links between the subsidies farmers receive, the crops they grow, and the prices they get for them. For what was supposed to be a five-year transition, the bill offered farmers $5 billion a year in direct payments.

The revolution didn’t last but the new “temporary” payments did. Sixteen years later, about $5 billion in direct-payment checks are still being written annually … These payments are based on an arcane formula tied to what was grown on the land years ago, no matter what crops—if any—are grown on the land now. Because the payment rights transfer with these specific plots, real estate prices are boosted—even on land that has never been cultivated by their current owners. Journalist Dan Morgan calls these payments “an entitlement tied to ownership of land—a construct that some would associate more with 19th century Prussia than 21st century America.” Half of the direct payments go to farmers with incomes above $100,000.

You might also be interested in how farm subsidies are historically connected to food stamps and continue to be to this day. But that is a relatively small part of the budget. How about defense spending, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security? Maybe you would like to know what non-defense discretionary spending, the 18 percent of our budget that goes for everything from NASA to preschool, actually consists of?

These are all topics I thought I knew a lot more about than I actually did. Wessel does a great job of explaining it all very simply without condescending his reader. The only time I remember his coming close to condescension is when discussing why the defense budget is so contentious, writing “Some of the decisions are too complex for ordinary civilians to understand.” But he’s certainly right on that score, and he does the larger arch of the narrative a service not getting bogged down in specifics that are above 95% of his readers pay-grade to explain the specifics we can all at least begin to get a grasp on—for instance, how many aircraft carriers we need as a nation and how that number affects our budget. He also makes points in simple ways that are succinct and sticky, writing for instance, “The Pentagon is more than an armada, though. It’s also among the world’s largest employers, with all that implies.” And as it turns out, that implies a lot. As Wessel informs us, during the Iraq War “the government was spending as much on healthcare—about $50 billion—as on the war.” And like most employers, that cost has only risen in subsequent years.

Wessel begins the book by quoting Jack Lew:

“The purpose of power is to get things done,” he once said. “Budgets aren’t books of numbers. They’re the tapestry, the fabric, of what we believe. The numbers tell a story, a self-portrait of what we are as a country.”

The problem is that we have two parties that are painting two incredibly different pictures, we’re split as as a population on which is better, and we’re all pretty convinced we’re right. When laid out in front of us in the clam and talented hand of Wessel, we begin to understand in more detail exactly what we’re deciding on, and that while it’s not going to be easy, fixing the deficit is entirely doable. It will most likely not be solved in this election season, but hopefully instead of arguing over illusions we can focus on the issues and begin a national dialogue that does eventually lead to a solution. If you’re interested that dialogue and in further education instead of soundbites and the pontification of pundits this election season, then this is certainly a book for you.

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July 23, 2012

The Best Business Writing 2012

Filed under: Book Reviews,Current Events,Finance and Economics,General Business,Global Business — dylan @ 11:10 am
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There is nothing that excites me quite as much as the English language when beautifully crafted, burdened with a purpose, and bearing the truth. I find it in my favorite poetry and great works of fiction that expose our human core, in artfully crafted works of nonfiction that explore the human story in all its facets and fascination, and yes, even in the best that business books have to offer.

But, I find it most often when I sit down with The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, or The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel every day over lunch, or when I follow the thread of a story contained in the a link in an email from ProPublica, when I relax with The New Yorker, Fast Company, and Foreign Affairs at home, or when I listen to a well-crafted story on This American Life or a great interview with Charlie Rose. It’s this everyday reporting, story-telling, and exploration of current events and interests—the fruits of our free press—that enriches and informs us on a daily basis, that many call the lifeblood of democracy, and that forms the tapestry of our collective intellectual lives.

In the first of what I hope will be many annual publications, The Best Business Writing 2012 from Columbia Journalism Review Books, edited by Dean Starkman. Martha M. Hamilton, Ryan Chittun, and Felix Salmon, captures much of the finest examples of that output from the last year in one collection. You’ll find within it some of the past year’s greatest stories crafted by some of the best storytellers working today, the most exhaustively researched and fact-checked journalism, with some opinionated and insightful commentary sprinkled throughout from the likes of Paul Krugman, Warren Buffett, and many more—all from a wide variety of sources and mediums. Dean Starkman’s introduction explains more:

[O]ur fearless panel scoured the Internet, approached traditional and nontraditional news organizations for what they thought was their best, and asked people in our networks what they had read and liked. We also asked Twitter and received some of our strongest entries. We didn’t care about medium. This book has newspapers, magazines, blogs, radio, even a movie. [...]

The result is a collection of nonfiction writing of the highest caliber. Never mind the subject, these are fantastic stories. You will find a riveting yarn of executive-suite intrigue at a major multinational corporation (psst, it’s Pfizer); fascinating behind-the-scenes profiles of businesses behaving badly (Countrywide, Massey), business behaving brilliantly (Ford), and business behaving weirdly (Ikea). You’ll read trenchant critiques of failed policy makers (yes, Greenspan is there) and business boners (Netflix, Hewlett Packard). You’ll find penetrating looks at a distorted market (psychotropic drugs) and searing investigations. We have insightful think pieces on subjects including the rise of the new elites, Steve Jobs’s genius, and Google’s omnipresence.

These kinds of anthologies are important not only because of the recognition they bestow upon great work, but because it is essential to put the events of the day into a larger context, and books like this help us do that.

George Santayana once wrote that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Living in the midst of the modern, 24-hour news cycle, it often seems like we’re stuck on repeat. We can barely remember what made the news yesterday, let alone last week or two months ago, but it usually feels the same as what’s happening today. If there is nothing to comfort or enrage us, you can be certain that something will be manufactured for those purposes, and all we have to do is turn the dial, flip the channel, or head to one of our go-to websites to find the feeling we’re looking for.

So often lost in the mix are the facts we should be seeking, and the stories that ferret them out. The Best Business Writing 2012 searched those facts and stories out and gathered them back up in one important and entertaining collection. Some of those facts and stories may challenge your beliefs and change your mind; I know they are doing so for me. You are also certain to find much that will comfort and/or enrage you. Most importantly, you will find excellent, purposeful writing, well-told stories, and a search for the truth.

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November 14, 2011

Thoughts on “Generation Sell”

Filed under: Careers,Current Events,Finance and Economics,General Business,Innovation — dylan @ 9:09 pm
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“The characteristic art form of our age may be the business plan.”

That quote comes from an intriguing opinion piece called Generation Sell that was published in the New York Times this weekend. It is a piece about a generation just coming of age and today’s youth culture. It really deserves to be read in its entirety, but I think that if one passage can sum up the basic argument of the article, it is this:

Today’s ideal social form is not the commune or the movement or even the individual creator as such; it’s the small business. Every artistic or moral aspiration—music, food, good works, what have you—is expressed in those terms.

Call it Generation Sell.

The piece was written by William Deresiewicz, and there is so much I agree with and so much I disagree with in it—and it’s all wound tightly together in a wonderful and entertaining piece of writing. I’m a member of the generation he’s writing about, “people born between the late ’70s and the mid-’90s, more or less,” so I probably took it more personally than others, more personally indeed than I should, but I do take issue with some of Deresiewicz’s characterizations.

The first issue I ran into was in what I think was an unnecessary or misguided attempt to say something about hip-hop, which has undoubtedly had an affect on the generation and merits mention, but the sentence Deresiewicz offers doesn’t do it justice. After describing the (counter)cultural characteristics of the beatniks, hippies and punks, he briefly offers this:

Hip-hop, punk’s younger brother, was all about rage and nihilism, too, at least until it turned to a vision of individual aggrandizement.

Because that’s all he offers us on the subject, I feel it would have been better to have left it out altogether. Because hip-hop, like jazz or rock-and-roll, shouldn’t be defined as a “youth-culture” in and of itself, but as an art form that influenced youth culture. And while some of its currents may have been “all about rage and nihilism,” it began as party music more predominantly wrapped up in a social conscience and commentary, cultural irreverence, and the urban art forms of dance, painting and poetry. There may have been a decent amount of rage there, but I don’t get the nihilism. To “punk’s younger brother” seems to miss its roots and how it ended up as part of the youth culture he’s critiquing. It would be more accurate to define it as a part of the millennial generation in the way he did with jazz and beatniks, of which he wrote:

Theirs was a culture of jazz, with its spontaneity; … of flight, on the road, to the West; of the quest for the perfect moment.

Something like this might have been more accurate:

Theirs was a culture of hip-hop, with its social conscience and cultural irreverence (and confusion); of finding a voice, of the city street; of the quest for personal invention and aggrandizement.

But, of course, that doesn’t ring true either, because it isn’t a culture defined solely by rap. The generation wasn’t defined by any single movement in music as much as previous generations have been—movements that the major record labels could latch onto and push out into the wider consciousness to become the soundtracks of their generations. I think, if anything, this generation was shaped by the demise of the major labels’ cultural influence, the proliferation of independent labels, and all the noise, cross-pollination, creativity and confusion that has spawned from that. The last real uprising or rebellious “movement” in popular music was the rise of grunge music in the ’90s. Since then, the only movement I can detect is one toward ever smaller, more focused independent labels. It is, as the author rightly notes, a movement to a new business model, and he’s right that “selling out” has largely left our lexicon since then:

It’s striking. Forty years ago, even 20 years ago, a young person’s first thought, or even second or third thought, was certainly not to start a business. That was selling out—an idea that has rather tellingly disappeared from our vocabulary.

But I think there’s a more important reason for that. “Selling out” used to mean that a band was abandoning one of the little labels so many cherished for a major. People were passionate about those labels—Dischord, Matador, Thrill Jockey, Touch & Go, etc.—and a move like that felt like an abandonment of something just on the verge of exploding and choosing a paycheck over principle. “Selling out” was also applied to those who sold a song for use in advertising, a move I don’t think many begrudge bands for anymore due to the paradigm shifts in the music industry. And I think the larger idea that starting a business 20 years ago was considered selling out is a misnomer. I doubt anyone accused Fugazi’s Ian MacKaye of selling out when he started Dischord in 1980, or told Aaron Rose he was selling out when he opened Alleged Gallery in the early ’90s. Selling out would have been signing with a major label or taking a job curating art at the The Met.

And this leads me to a the generalized character at the heart of the article—the “hipster” that the author feels is “a lot more representative [of the Millennial Generation] than most of them care to admit.” The definition is bandied about and applied to many people, but I’m still not sure what exactly a “hipster” is (though perhaps n+1‘s What Was the Hipster could help), and putting it in the same category as the counterculture figures that preceded it seems problematic to me. Beatniks, hippies and punks were all actively participating in larger countercultures, and defined themselves with those movements. The one predominant characteristic of a “hipster” is that nobody self-identifies with it. It’s always a label attached to others, and usually with a heavy dose of derision. As such, it’s not really a counterculture that anybody’s participating in or defining themselves with as much as it’s, if anything, an alternative lifestyle loosely defined. I do agree with the author that this lifestyle and its bohemian values were heavily influenced by the baby boomers and “Bobo in Paradise” parents that David Brooks wrote about a decade ago.

But outside of the skinny pants and fixed gear bicycles, the irony and the vanity, the defining character traits of the so-called “hipster” lifestyle—being young, urban, fashionable, artistic, and entrepreneurial—are mostly seen as positives. And I think the aversion to the label “hipster” is an aversion to labels and definitions in general. This generation hasn’t fully defined itself and doesn’t want to be defined by others—even their peers. Statistically, it’s more likely to switch jobs many times, move to new cities, to freelance, start a business of the their own or work for themselves. I don’t think of this as the end of history of counterculture in any major way, but as the rise of many independent yet interconnected subcultures that are entering the popular culture in a way that mirrors how previous countercultures were absorbed and watered down—except that today’s subcultures seem to be entering it with more artistic and economic control and largely on their own terms.

The characteristic art form of our age is not the business plan; it is do-it-yourself, independent local production, scale and control. Most people I know didn’t start with a business plan and still don’t have one. They started with a vision and are working every day to realize it. They made the decision to strike out on their own and practice their art, craft or trade—and hope people value their vision enough to pay for it. My wife, a self-employed photographer, began Ellagraph Studios. My friend dwellephant is a working artist. My friends Daniel and Maria run Ball & Biscuit, the best catering company in Milwaukee. My neighbors run Orchard Street Press, an eco-friendly printing company. I could go on and on, and wouldn’t be able to find a “hipster” in the bunch—just a lot of hard-working, creative and passionate people.

If I could sum up the generation, it would be with the once annoying labels “indie” or “underground” (which became so annoying simply by virtue of being such ubiquitous labels). The indie rock and the underground dance music and hip-hop that grew up in the ’80s and ’90s dominated the subcultures that we ourselves grew up in, and have since turned into more codified and sustainable (though possibly not very profitable) small business models. That simple yet profound change in how we learn about, purchase and consume (in the best sense of that word) the music that so shaped us during our formative years has fundamentally altered the cultural landscape. The “rockstars” of our generation were closer to us, more accessible, usually a part of our artistic communities. And alongside the independent music sprang up independent labels, music venues, galleries, coffee shops, screen printing operations, skate shops, DIY arts and crafts fairs. The internet then came along and kicked it all into overdrive.

The author says “the hipster ethos contains no element of rebellion, rejection or dissent.” But I think that that is what so defines the generation. It’s a rebellion of production, a commercial rejection and inner dissent. It’s a rejection of corporate principles and a simple consumer choice for the alternative. It’s a generation not fundamentally different in attitude than its predecessors, but in the solutions it offers. The heretics of today saw previous generations’ protests and rebellions crushed in the street, so they rented the abandoned buildings beside it and started trying to build something new inside them. It’s in some ways a return to mom-and-pop capitalism.

Sure, you can call it “generation sell,” but I think “selling” is a dirty word rather deliberately used. It could easily be called “generation create” or “generation present.” It does often seem as if everyone nowadays has something to present, advertise, market or “sell,” but by-and-large I think it was and is being done with good art, the right intention and decent manners. And if one of the results of that shift is that people fault this generation for being polite and pleasant, well… being the affable generation it is, I think they’d be okay with that.

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October 31, 2011

Halloween, Zombies and the Devil’s Derivatives

Filed under: Book Reviews,Finance and Economics — dylan @ 2:20 pm
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This may be a ghost story. It happened on a dark night mistaken for morning in America, a night that would descend over the entire financial world.

Nicholas Dunbar sets the scene in his book, The Devil’s Derivatives:

For most of it’s history, our financial system was built by on the stolid, cautious decisions of bankers, the men who hate to lose. This cautious investment mind-set drove the creation of socially useful financial institutions over the last few hundred years. … People like that did not drive the kind of astronomical growth seen in the last two decades.

So who did create that astronomical growth? Dunbar tells of encountering them one evening while they were “celebrating their annual bacchanal, which is also known as “bonus season.’”

I knew bout some of them: there was the head of the financial institutions derivatives marketing who forgot which of his Italian supercars had been towed off to the car pound. There was the head of credit structuring notorious for preying on female staff and having his corporate credit cards stolen by prostitutes. These young men—and almost all of them were young, some shockingly so—were the avant-garde of the credit derivatives boom, enjoying the first, fifth, or tenth million. … There are many sobriquets for these young lions, but I like to think of them as the men who love to win.

So the stage is set for a battle between the men who love to win, for whom “any uncertain bet is a chance to become unbelievably happy, and the misery of losing barely merits a moment’s consideration,” and the men who hate to lose, who “are attached to the idea of certainty and stability” (you can think of them as vampires and werewolves). But the battle never happened. The moon was just right that night.

[T]he love-to-win mindset spread like a virus. With all that pixie dust—or was it filthy lucre?—these bankers sprinkled across London and New York, who could be surprised that their influence spread? First, it infected the traditional bankers (and their hate-to-lose cousins at insurance companies, municipalities, and pension funds). Men and women who had been pillars of the communities from Newcastle-upon-Tyne to Seattle shrugged off their time-honored—boring!—roles of prudently taking deposits and offering loans and started wanting to make “real” money. Regional bankers in turn spread it to consumers, who were encouraged to drop their “antiquated,” risk-averse attitudes toward borrowing and home ownership. And thus was born the greatest wealth-generating machine the world had ever seen. It was truly awe inspiring in its raw power and avarice, and truly horrifying when it came crashing down.

Dunbar traces this all to a new emphasis on shareholder value among banks in the late ’80s and the rise of new derivatives that would help banks increase that value, sparking “the innovation race between two ways of transferring credit risk: the old-fashioned ‘letter of credit’ versus a recent invention, the credit default swap.” Perhaps it’s a good idea to briefly define exactly what a derivative is (to the best of my limited knowledge). A derivative is essentially a forward contract on a future transaction that allows each side to reduce uncertainty and “square up logistics.” The largest derivatives market in the world is in interest rates, with the most common being the interest rate swap. The most destructive derivative has been the credit default swap:

Rather than being linked to currency markets, interest rates, stocks, or commodities, these derivatives were linked to unmitigated financial disaster: the default of loans or bonds. I found it hard to imagine who might be interested in buying such a derivative from a bank. The nonfinancial companies whose activities in the globalized economy exposed them to financial uncertainty didn’t seem interested. The derivatives that were useful to them—futures, options, and swaps linked to commodities, currencies, and interest rates—had already been invented. It seemed to me as if the credit default swap as an invention searching for a real purpose. As it happened, the kind of companies that found credit default swaps most relevant were those that had lots of default risk on their books: the banks [themselves].

This allowed money to flow much more freely as institutions could make loans they weren’t responsible for recovering, loans could be bundled into credit default obligations (CDOs), and you could speculate on that bundle of loans with credit default swaps. It was, essentially, creating money out of thin air, loaning it to whoever would take it and then buying insurance on it just to turn a buck. The problem is that there are a finite number of applicants out there qualified to take out loans the banks could bundle, and invented money is infinite. So they started loaning money to folks who they knew wouldn’t be able to pay it back, and this is where the zombies come into the story.

Having flooded the market with seemingly safe investments larded with subprime money, the traders created zombie banks to buy them. Brick-and-mortar banks liked these zombies, because they evaded accounting rules and regulations, and increased profits. Hungry for higher fees, ratings agencies encouraged the growth of this new market and undermined governance. Wall Street saw the zombie structured investment vehicles (SIVs) as ideal “dumb money” customers for buying subprime CDOs and began setting them up specifically for this purpose. But at first whiff of in 2007, investors fled this market, causing the zombies to collapse almost overnight. Banks were forced to bail them out, which increased their subprime problems

And that’s when it all came crashing down, when the banks realized that they didn’t even know how much risk they were carrying, and when the government stepped in to essentially insure an unknown and bail out the banks.

Well, at least the men who love to win “got theirs” for awhile, even if the rest of us largely lost out when it all came crashing down. But here’s my question: Was all that wealth, all those profits they created and moved around during those boom years really, truly growth? Or was it just a ghost?

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September 22, 2011

Joe Nocera Interview

Filed under: Blog,Finance and Economics — Jon @ 9:16 am
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The following post and Q&A was written and submitted by Tom Ehrenfeld.

Joe Nocera is one of the best business journalists working today. He combines a deep knowledge of business with a healthy dose of skepticism, not to mention a good journalist’s passion for poking the powerful in the eye when they need it. His latest book, All the Devils Are here, co-authored with Bethany McLean (co-author of the definitive Enron book The Smartest Guys in the Room), provides the most comprehensive, even-handed, and insightful coverage of the financial crisis of 2008. Instead of running on about how good this book is, I’ll just share a few short excerpts that feature the crisp writing and clear analysis that give this book its power.

“Here was the ultimate consequence of the delinking of borrower and lender, which securitization had made possible: no one in the chain, from broker to subprime originator to Wall Street, cared that the loans they were making and selling were likely to go bad. In truth, they were all taking on huge risks in granting these terrible loans. But they were all making too much money to see it. Everyone assumed that someone else would be left holding the bag.” (p. 228)

“All over Wall Street, an immense amount of risk was building up in the system. It wasn’t just that firms were taking on risk when they bought subprime mortgages and bundled them into securities, or when they kept some of the leftover pieces themselves, or when they bought whole subprime mortgage originators. Over the course of a decade, subprime mortgages had managed to seep into Wall Street’s bloodstream, as firms used products created out of them to increase leverage, reduce capital, generate profits, and, more generally, game the risk-based rules that were originally intended to give firms the flexibility to deal with the modern world. All of which also meant that the increasing risk was masked by layer upon layer of complexity, hidden where few on the outside could see it.” (p. 240)

Joe recently took time to answer a few questions:

Other crisis chronicles have gone out of their way to personalize the story—they characterize the events as outcomes of the greed of power brokers like Fannie Mae CEO Jim Johnson, or dramatize the tenacious efforts of a prescient short to get the world to listen to his insights. But your book ratchets down the “you are there” reconstruction of dramatic events, choosing instead to reveal how systematic forces inexorably caused the meltdown. Was this a conscious decision? If so, why?

Joe Nocera: We absolutely made a conscious decision to report and write it this way. We always knew we wanted to write about the underlying causes. We didn’t know where that would take us. Bethany had grounding with Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac—she had written about them for Vanity Fair and Fortune. I had grounding in issues surrounding Wall Street. From there we dove in without precisely knowing where we were going. I was thinking about subprime in terms of Wall Street. But Bethany saw very early on that the subprime issues began on Main Street. And so that was where you had to start. You had to start by examining where subprime mortgage lending came from, how it became popular, and how it became predatory. Tracing the rise of subprime lending was critical. Bethany figured that out very quickly and it turned out to be genius. I was tracking Lou Ranieri and the rise of mortgage-backed securities. She was writing about the rise of subprime. She stumbled upon Roland Arnault at Ameriquest and figured out that he was ground zero for shitty subprime mortgages.

And so we basically started to see this as a story that had a chronology that moved back and forth from Main Street to Wall Street to Washington with side trips to the ratings agencies. And at a certain point we realized we were putting together a jigsaw puzzle, and it would be an accomplishment to put the pieces together and not see the individual pieces. That was not what we had at day one but at the end we did so because that was where our strengths lie—in analytical skills and writing ability.

Does your approach shift some of the blame from individual behavior, focusing instead on ways that the system was rigged to fail?

JN: We were living in a bubble mentality and not just the last few years—a bubble mentality that let Washington think deregulation made sense, that let Countryside think it made sense to give out subprime, that let rating agencies bundle subprime into tranches and have seventy percent be triple A. These were mass delusions. Like tulips. But within that mass delusion people did things they knew they shouldn’t have been doing. Credit agencies knew they were selling their soul to the devil by rating these tranches as AAA. And you can go down the line with this: the guy at Merrill Lynch who took a $5 billion exposure and turned it into a $55 billion at the end of the year. Lots of people at Merrill Lynch knew this was not going to end well and they did not care.

There seems to be a striking contrast in the tone of your first book, A Piece of the Action, which you have said is about “the democratization of money” through the growth in individuals investing in stocks more than 25 years ago. It seems quaint today to think about, say, Peter Lynch advising individuals to buy stock in companies whose products they like. That represents a far simpler, and more old-fashioned approach than the way Wall Street operates today.

JN: A Piece of the Action came out in early 1994. Nine months later Netscape had its IPO. I remember that stretch of time between the publication of the book and that particular IPO. And the truth is that my book became quaint on that very day. Netscape’s IPO was the day that everything changed: everybody wanted to get rich quick, individual investors got hooked on the market in a fundamentally new way. That was the day that the modern Wall Street, for better or worse, was created.

One of the most discouraging threads in this book has to do with the failure of any regulatory agency to identify common industry practices as predatory, unsustainable, and potentially catastrophic to the economy. In a new afterword, for the paperback edition, you are unconvinced that the new regulations have sufficient power to correct the underlying causes of the crisis. Are you any more sanguine about the ability of Washington to prevent the recent crisis from recurring?

JN: I don’t know if the new regulations are sufficient or not. It seems to me that Dodd- Frank fiddled with the world as it existed in 2008 rather than trying to radically change that world in ways that would make us feel safe. And since the House Republicans have taken over, the pushback has been incredible. It’s been like the eighth season of Dallas where what happened was like a dream. It’s like the crisis never happened, and it’s absurd. They’re fighting capital requirements, fighting everything. And it’s infuriating to watch this.

I think you have to go back to the response in the 1930s. Its incredible that at the time Congress went to Morgan Bank and said, we are splitting you in two. It’s incredible that that the country had the wherewithal to do that, and that they went ahead and did do it. We did not have another major financial crisis for 80 years. And that is the best you can hope for with financial regulation.

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